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The Objection Exception is
Overruled! The Georgia Supreme
Court Makes a Course Correction
by Reviving the Contemporaneous
Objection Rule
Ryan Read*
I. INTRODUCTION
What comes to mind when you think of evidence being presented at
jury trials? Typically, both sides prevent evidence to the jury, and both
sides fight hard to make sure no prejudicial evidence is allowed in that
would bias the jury against their client. Both sides also work hard to
prepare persuasive openings and closings to further affect the jury’s
perception of their client, the opposition, and the evidence that has been
presented. So, when an attorney on one side makes prejudicial
statements about the opposing counsel’s client, one would naturally
expect an objection to be made, right? Well, in Georgia, you would be
wrong.1 Until Williams v. Harvey,2 trial lawyers were essentially
allowed to ignore critical objections. Whenever prejudicial statements
against their client were made, even ones that violated already granted
motions in limine, counsel could sit back, not object, and later get the
case reversed on appeal.3 It was that easy. Even if a trial lawyer lost,
* I would like to sincerely thank and acknowledge my fellow law review members as well
as the Editorial Board for their help and encouragement in writing this Casenote.
Additionally, I would like to thank my parents and family for always supporting me
through my endeavors.
1. See generally Williams v. Harvey, 311 Ga. 439, 443–44, 858 S.E.2d 479, 484–85
(2021) (describing how, prior to this decision, Georgia’s caselaw did not require
contemporaneous objections to prejudicial statements to be made at trial, thus allowing
the statements to be preserved for appeal).
2. 311 Ga. 439, 858 S.E.2d 479 (2021).
3. Id. at 443–44, 46, 858 S.E.2d at 485, 487.
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the attorney still had a chance of getting the case overturned,
essentially creating a “win-win” scenario. Fortunately for Johnny
Williams, the Georgia Supreme Court decided that trial lawyers would
no longer be allowed to sit on their hands at trial and must
contemporaneously object to prejudicial statements when the
statements are made instead of raising the cost of the litigation for an
unnecessary appeal.4
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Johnny Williams (Williams) was a sixty-seven-year-old who enjoyed
physical activity, including yard work; singing in his church choir; and
being around his friends and family.5 On April 11, 2013, Williams was
driving a tractor for his employer when Rubin Harvey (Harvey), the
Defendant, driving a dump truck for Oxford Construction Company
(Oxford), crashed into him. Williams was thrown from his tractor into a
ditch off the highway. Due to this accident, Williams suffered critical
injuries, including traumatic brain injuries, multiple bone fractures,
and seizures. After spending six weeks in the hospital and five weeks in
a rehabilitation center, Williams was discharged to his home, where he
needed twenty-four-hour supervision from nursing assistants to
monitor his daily activities. As a result of his injuries, Williams suffered
daily. He developed dementia, had trouble walking, became agitated
and confused, and was forced to take medication each day to cope with
these hardships.6
Williams’s family later filed suit against both Harvey and Oxford for
negligence in causing Williams’s injuries.7 At trial, both defendants
conceded that Harvey was negligent in causing Williams’s injuries, and
the only issue was how Williams’s damages would be apportioned
between them. While at trial, two life care plan options were formulated
for Williams and presented as remedies for his future medical costs.
The first option, the home care option, provided Williams stay at his
home, while the second option, the residential memory care unit or
nursing home option, provided Williams move into a nursing home. An
economics expert who testified at trial calculated the total special
damages for the home care option to be $3,382,383.15. Whereas the cost
for the residential memory care unit option would be $2,008,790.15.

4.
5.
6.
7.

Id. at 450–52, 858 S.E.2d at 489–90.
Id. at 440, 858 S.E.2d at 482–83.
Id. at 439–40, 858 S.E.2d at 482–83.
Id. at 440–41, 858 S.E.2d at 483.
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After trial, the jury returned a verdict of $18,000,000 in favor of
Williams.8 Harvey and Oxford then filed a motion for new trial on the
grounds that, during his closing, Williams’s counsel violated the trial
court’s pretrial motion in limine ruling against arguments that would
“overly inflame the emotions of the jury.”9 Upon consideration of the
motion, the trial court held that there was no violation of the motions in
limine against inflammatory arguments.10
Initially, the trial court reserved ruling on the defendants’ motion in
limine as it pertained to potential testimony or evidence, but held “any
statements, arguments, or evidence offered predominantly to overly
inflame the emotions of the jury or to elicit excessive or undue
sympathy, hostility, or prejudice for or against either party is
prohibited.”11 Counsel for Oxford and Harvey contended this ruling was
violated when Williams’s counsel, during his closing argument, stated
to the jury, “I hope your verdict is not a double-down on sentencing him
to a nursing home because if you sentence him to a nursing home,
you’re signing his death warrant.”12
Oxford and Harvey then appealed the trial court’s ruling to the
Georgia Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in failing to
prevent the opposing counsel’s inflammatory remarks during the
opposing counsel’s closing argument.13 The court of appeals reversed
the trial court’s ruling, holding Williams’s closing argument clearly
violated the trial court’s motion in limine ruling preventing
inflammatory remarks when his counsel likened the nursing home plan
to sentencing Williams to death.14 The court of appeals also held that
the trial court’s ruling on the motion in limine was sufficient, by itself,
to preserve the issue for appeal even though there was no
8. Id. at 440–41, 858 S.E.2d at 483. The trial court credited both defendants with an
insurance payout of $5,432,103.84 and entered a judgment in favor of Williams for
$12,567,896.16. Id. at 441, 858 S.E.2d at 483. Also, the trial court awarded Williams with
a prejudgment interest for $1,865,753.42 because both defendants failed to accept
Williams’s pretrial demand for $6,000,000. Id.
9. Harvey v. Williams, 354 Ga. App. 766, 768, 841 S.E.2d 386, 389 (2020).
10. Id. at 768, 841 S.E.2d at 389.
11. Id. The defendants sought to exclude, via motion in limine, all statements,
contentions, arguments, inferences, or proffer of any evidence that would elicit sympathy
for Williams. However, the trial court narrowed the scope of this broad motion. Id.
12. Id. Also, during Williams’s closing argument, his counsel alluded to the
stereotypical notions of what happens to patients at nursing homes: “[L]et’s just face it,
we hear all the time about what goes on in a nursing home. I do not in good conscience
believe that you are desiring to do that to Mr. Williams.” Id.
13. Id. at 768–69, 841 S.E.2d at 389.
14. Williams, 311 Ga. at 442, 858 S.E.2d at 484.
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contemporaneous objection at the time of the violation.15 Williams then
appealed to the Georgia Supreme Court who issued a writ of certiorari
allowing for review of the court of appeals’ decision.16 The supreme
court reversed the appellate court’s holding and determined Harvey and
Oxford’s counsel were required to contemporaneously object to
Williams’s attorney’s inflammatory remarks as a violation of the motion
in limine.17 The supreme court disagreed with the court of appeals and
held that the pretrial motion in limine, by itself, was not sufficient to
preserve the violation for appeal because a contemporaneous objection
was needed.18 From this determination, the supreme court also held
that, in civil cases, there is no need for appellate review of unpreserved
claims of error during closing arguments.19 After reaching this
conclusion, the supreme court then overruled its decision in Stotle v.
Fagan20 as well as other cases that followed it.21
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Contemporaneous Objection Rule
The “contemporaneous objection rule,” is the “doctrine that a timely
and proper objection to the admission of evidence must be made at trial
to afford the trial court an opportunity to conduct a meaningful inquiry
into possible prejudice before or promptly after verdict and to preserve
the issue for appeal.”22 The rule is a common law rule independently
developed by the states and, thus, may differ depending upon
jurisdiction, but most jurisdictions share similar rules.23 The primary
purpose of the rule is to allow the trial court the opportunity to take any
necessary corrective action at the time the alleged error is made, and
thus, reduce the possibility an appeal will result in a reversal.24 This

15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 447, 858 S.E.2d at 487.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 449, 858 S.E.2d at 488–89.
20. 291 Ga. 477, 731 S.E.2d 653, overruled by Williams, 311 Ga. at 451, 858 S.E.2d at
490.
21. Williams, 311 Ga. at 449–51, 858 S.E.2d at 488–90.
22. Contemporaneous Objection Rule, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
23. Stacy L. Davis. et al., FEDERAL PROCEDURE LAWYER’S EDITION § 41:320, Westlaw
(database updated Sept. 2021).
24. Michael H. Graham, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 103:2 (9th ed.), Westlaw
(database updated Nov. 2020).
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corrective action includes allowing the trial court to provide curative
instructions to the jury, which may help negate any prejudice that
occurred due to the violation.25 Also, as noted by the Supreme Court of
the United States in Wainright v. Sykes,26 the rule prevents
“sandbagging” lawyers from purposefully failing to object so they may
raise the error on appeal and get the judgment reversed.27 This
sentiment is similarly echoed in the Georgia Supreme Court case,
Weldon v. State,28 where the supreme court held a party cannot ignore
an injustice at trial and then appeal the injustice after failing to receive
a favorable verdict.29
Georgia’s contemporaneous objection rule requires counsel to make a
proper objection, on the record, to an alleged error at the earliest
possible moment in order to preserve it on appeal.30 The
contemporaneous objection rule has been the foundation for trial
practice and evidentiary issues in Georgia for over 150 years,31 as
displayed by both Burtine v. State32 in 1855 and Goodtitle v. Roe33 in
1856.
In Burtine, the Solicitor General examined one of the jurors to
determine if the juror was competent, and the defendant’s counsel
permitted the questioning to continue without raising an objection.34 On
appeal to the supreme court, the defendant’s counsel argued it was an
error to question the juror. The court determined it was unnecessary to
decide whether it was proper for the Solicitor General to question the
juror because the question was permitted without any objection. The
court held that, to preserve an error on appeal, an objection must be
made at trial.35

25. Lynn v. State, 310 Ga. 608, 612, 852 S.E.2d 843, 849 (2020) (describing how a
trial court can negate the harmful effects that improperly introduced evidence may have
on a jury by providing prompt curative instructions rather than by simply granting a
mistrial).
26. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
27. Id. at 89–90.
28. 297 Ga. 537, 775 S.E.2d 522 (2015).
29. Id. at 541, 775 S.E.2d at 525.
30. Williams, 311 Ga. at 442, 858 S.E.2d at 484.
31. Id.
32. 18 Ga. 534 (1855).
33. 20 Ga. 135 (1856).
34. Burtine, 18 Ga. at 535.
35. Id. at 536–37.
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The supreme court made a similar decree in Goodtitle, except it
applied the rule to evidence instead of testimony or examinations.36 In
Goodtitle, an action for ejectment to recover land, deeds were brought in
as evidence to show proof of ownership, and the defense objected to a
specific deed brought in by the administrator of the land.37 The court
ultimately decided a court is not bound to exclude evidence, even
inadmissible evidence, unless the evidence was objected to and grounds
for the objection were stated. If a party fails to object to the evidence,
then the party is considered to have waived its right to appeal, and the
evidence may be properly heard by the jury.38
Georgia’s contemporaneous objection rule has remained relatively
the same since both Burtine and Goodtitle, with the only changes being
what the rule may apply to at trial.39 For instance, in the 1996 case
Miller v. State,40 the defendant alleged the District Attorney improperly
characterized facts not in evidence and made prejudicial statements
during closing argument; however, the defendant failed to object at the
time these statements were made.41 The supreme court held that the
defendant’s failure to object to the allegedly improper arguments at the
time they occurred did not allow the trial court an opportunity to
remedy the situation. This failure to object precluded any appellate
review. Thus, the supreme court’s conclusion helped to support the fact
that the contemporaneous objection rule applies to evidence presented
at trial as well as arguments made at trial.42
The
contemporaneous
objection
rule
seems
relatively
straightforward. However, when paired with Georgia’s unclear caselaw
interpreting motions in limine, the rule becomes more difficult to
interpret and apply.
B. Motions in Limine
A motion in limine is a pretrial motion or request used in primarily
two ways: (1) to prevent certain evidence from being referenced to or
offered at trial (also known as a “prohibitive” or “prophylactic” order); or
(2) to allow the court to establish and make a final ruling on the
36. Goodtitle, 20 Ga. at 140–41.
37. Id. at 137–38.
38. Id. at 140.
39. Williams, 311 Ga. at 442, 858 S.E.2d at 484. See generally Sharpe v. Ga. Dept. of
Transp., 267 Ga. 267, 476 S.E.2d 722 (1996); Weldon, 297 Ga. at 541, 775 S.E.2d at 525.
40. 267 Ga. 92, 475 S.E.2d 610 (1996).
41. Id. at 92, 475 S.E.2d at 611.
42. Id.
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admissibility of evidence prior to trial (also known as an “exclusionary”
order).43 The primary purpose of a motion in limine is to preclude either
irrelevant or prejudicial evidence from being presented and then
objected to in front of a jury.44 Typically, motions in limine may limit
the admissibility of any kind of evidence that may normally be objected
to at trial, including witness testimony, privileged matters, sensitive
terms, prior settlements and lawsuits, and other similar things.45
For instance, in Tollete v. State,46 where a criminal defendant argued
he deserved a new trial due to the prosecution’s improper remarks
during closing, the supreme court noted a motion in limine may be used
to limit evidence as well as specific arguments made at trial.47 However,
in Harley Davidson Motor Co. v. Daniel,48 the supreme court changed
how motions in limine would affect issue preservation on appeal, thus
modifying how the contemporaneous objection rule would operate and
apply at trial.49
In Harley Davidson Motor Co., the supreme court held for the first
time that when a motion in limine to exclude evidence was denied, the
moving party did not need to renew its objection at trial to preserve the
party’s right to appeal.50 In this products liability case, the plaintiff
attempted to use a motion in limine to exclude a recall letter from being
introduced at trial.51 The trial court denied the motion in limine for an
exclusionary order, and the recall letter was admitted at trial without
an objection. On appeal, the court of appeals held that, despite the
ruling on the motion in limine, a contemporaneous objection was still
needed to preserve the issue for review. The supreme court disagreed
with the court of appeals and, for the first time, held that motions in
limine, by themselves, may preserve an issue on appeal even if the
motion was denied. In doing so, the court decided a further objection
was not necessary as the trial court was put on notice of possible error
43. Williams, 311 Ga. at 442, 858 S.E.2d at 484. See also Susan E. Loggans,
LITIGATING TORTS CASES § 19:3, Westlaw (database updated Sept. 2021) (explaining
different types of motions in limine).
44. Williams, 311 Ga. at 442, 858 S.E.2d at 484. See also Henry B. Rothblatt, 20 AM.
JUR. TRIALS 441 § 2, Westlaw (database updated Dec. 2021) (analyzing the nature and
purpose of motions in limine).
45. Rothblatt, supra note 44, §§ 10, 16, 18–20, 25.
46. 280 Ga. 100, 621 S.E.2d 742 (2005).
47. Id. at 103–05, 621 S.E.2d at 747–48.
48. 244 Ga. 284, 260 S.E.2d 20 (1979).
49. Williams, 311 Ga. at 443, 858 S.E.2d at 484–85.
50. Id.
51. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 244 Ga. at 284–85, 260 S.E.2d at 21–22.
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by the motion in limine. Also, a further objection in front of the jury
would only highlight the disputed evidence and create new problems.
The court also analyzed the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) as they
existed at the time and determined, specifically, FRE 103(c) supported
the court’s holding.52
Due to the court’s holding in Harley Davidson Motor Co., a party no
longer needs to renew its objection when disputed evidence is
introduced at trial as long as they had a prior ruling on a motion in
limine. The motion in limine ruling, by itself, serves as a way to
preserve the moving party’s right to appeal, thus removing the
requirement for a contemporaneous objection at trial.
Three years later, in Reno v. Reno,53 the Georgia Supreme Court
applied the same reasoning from Harley Davidson Motor Co.54 In Reno,
an action for divorce, the husband’s counsel sought a motion in limine
to limit testimony regarding any adultery allegations that might have
been made or alluded to by his ex-wife.55 The trial court granted the
motion and issued a prohibitive order. At trial, the wife violated this
order while testifying, but the husband’s counsel made no objection at
the time of the violation. On appeal to the supreme court, the issue was
whether a party needed to contemporaneously object to a violation of an
already granted motion in limine in order to preserve that issue for
review. The supreme court held that the reasoning in Harley Davidson
Motor Co., also applied to the current situation, where a motion in
limine had been granted, and thus, a further objection was not needed.
The court made this determination as it believed requiring an
additional objection at trial would defeat the purpose of the motion in
limine and only bring more attention to the prejudicial evidence.56
The rulings of Reno and Harley Davidson Motor Co. cemented the
notion that a contemporaneous objection to disputed evidence was no
longer needed as long as there was any prior ruling, either denied or
granted, on a motion in limine.57 The prior ruling would then preserve
the issue for appeal.58 This rule only applied to disputed evidence and
not to disputed arguments made by counsel.59 However, after these
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 285–86, 260 S.E.2d at 22.
249 Ga. 855, 295 S.E.2d 94 (1982).
Williams, 311 Ga. at 443, 858 S.E.2d at 484.
Reno, 249 Ga. at 855, 295 S.E.2d at 95.
Id. at 855–56, 295 S.E.2d at 95–96.
Williams, 311 Ga. at 443, 858 S.E.2d at 484–85.
Id.
Id. at 443, 858 S.E.2d at 485.
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decisions by the supreme court, the court of appeals began applying and
extending this new rule to motions in limine regarding argument as
well.60 These decisions made by the court of appeals would eventually
conflict with future Georgia statutes and caselaw, adding more
confusion to procedural rules which should be easy to understand and
apply.
C. Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 103 and the Adoption of O.C.G.A.
§ 24-1-103
In 2000, FRE 10361 (pertaining to rulings on evidence) was amended
to clarify that when a trial court makes a definite ruling on the record,
either before or at trial, a party does not need to renew an objection to
preserve a claim for appeal.62 This amendment applies to all evidentiary
rulings, including rulings on motions in limine.63 Also, this amendment
was made to help ease uncertainty for litigants as there were differing
rules across the country for handling the interaction between motions
in limine and contemporaneous objections.64 However, the Advisory
Committee for the amendment noted that if an opposing party violated
the initial ruling on a motion in limine, an objection must be made at
the time the evidence was offered to preserve the issue for appeal.65
This change in the FRE goes against the rules previously stated above
and held by the Georgia Supreme Court and the Georgia Court of
Appeals, but the change would not cause issues until later as Georgia’s
evidence code at the time was not patterned after the FRE.66 This is
significant because, in 2011, the Georgia General Assembly enacted
Georgia’s new evidence code and largely patterned it after the FRE.67
The new evidence code took effect on January 1, 2013, and it
established O.C.G.A. § 24-1-103,68 which is specifically patterned after
FRE 103.69 Since the inception of Georgia’s new evidence code, Georgia
courts have held if a rule in the evidence code is materially identical to
the FRE, then the Georgia courts must look to federal appellate court
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
FED. R. EVID. 103.
Williams, 311 Ga. at 444, 858 S.E.2d at 485.
Id.; FED. R. EVID. 103 Advisory Committee’s Note to 2000 amendment.
FED. R. EVID. 103 Advisory Committee’s Note to 2000 amendment.
Williams, 311 Ga. at 444, 858 S.E.2d at 485.
Id. at 444–45, 858 S.E.2d at 485–86.
Id. at 444–45, 858 S.E.2d at 485.
O.C.G.A. § 24-1-103 (2021).
Williams, 311 Ga. at 445, 858 S.E.2d at 485.
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decisions, especially the Supreme Court of the United States and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.70 Further, in
Harris v. State71 and Beck v. State,72 both 2020 cases, the Georgia
Supreme Court concluded that the adoption of the new evidence code
officially abrogated previous Georgia evidentiary rules and caselaw.73
Also, the supreme court noted in Smith v. State74 (a case decided about
a month earlier than Williams) that the Advisory Committee Notes are
highly persuasive when interpreting and applying the new evidence
code.
Thus, Georgia courts no longer look to old state court cases, such as
Harley Davidson Motor Co. and Reno, when applying the new evidence
rules. Instead, courts look to how the federal appellate courts have
applied the contemporaneous objection rule in tandem with motions in
limine. For example, in Cephus v. CSX Transportation, Inc.75 and
Thorncreek Apartments III, LLC v. Mick,76 both federal appellate cases,
the courts required a contemporaneous objection to arguments that
violated prohibitive motion in limine rulings.77 These discrepancies—
between the old Georgia cases relying on outdated evidentiary rules and
caselaw and the new cases applying the newly adopted evidence code—
have created confusion in determining what rules should be applied.
D. O.C.G.A. § 9-10-185 and Stolte v. Fagan: Two Ways Around the
Contemporaneous Objection Rule
When there is a violation of a motion in limine without a
contemporaneous objection, a party may achieve appellate review
through two routes.78 The first route is by claiming that the ruled-upon
motion in limine should be considered an “objection made” so that a
contemporaneous objection to the alleged violation is not required.79
70. Id. at 444–45, 858 S.E.2d at 485–86. Since the adoption of Georgia’s new evidence
code in 2011, the Georgia state courts look to the federal appellate courts for guidance
when interpreting the new code as the federal courts have experience in applying the
FRE. Id.
71. 310 Ga. 372, 850 S.E.2d 77 (2020).
72. 310 Ga. 491, 852 S.E.2d 535 (2020).
73. Harris, 310 Ga. at 378, 850 S.E.2d at 83 n.14; Beck, 310 Ga. at 498, 852 S.E.2d at
541 n.3.
74. 311 Ga. 288, 291, 857 S.E.2d 698, 700 n.4.
75. 771 F. App’x 883 (11th Cir. 2019).
76. 886 F.3d 626 (7th Cir. 2018).
77. Cephus, 771 F. App’x. at 895; Mick, 886 F.3d at 635.
78. Williams, 311 Ga. at 447, 858 S.E.2d at 487.
79. Id. at 447–48, 858 S.E.2d at 487–88.
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This route is taken through O.C.G.A. § 9-10-185,80 which provides that
“[o]n objection made” to an improper argument, the court may rebuke
counsel, provide jury instructions, and order a mistrial.81 However, this
route would likely not work for the defendants in this case as the
objection made requirement has consistently been interpreted as
requiring a contemporaneous objection, thus not allowing a motion in
limine to act in its place.82
The second route for potential appellate review was through Mullins
v. Thompson,83 which provides that appellate courts may still review
improper arguments made during closing, even without a timely
contemporaneous objection, if the improper argument “in reasonable
probability” changed the result of the trial.84 Mullins represents the
first time the Georgia Supreme Court applied the “reasonable
probability” standard to a civil case where there was a failure to object
to an improper closing.85 However, the supreme court has criticized this
route in the past.86 For instance, in Stolte, the court questioned whether
there was any validity for appellate review of untimely objections to
closing arguments in civil cases, when such review is not conducted in
any other instances besides death penalty cases.87 This standard of
review does not have large precedential value as it has only been
applied twice in civil cases since Mullins: the first time being in Moxley
v. Moxley,88 and the second time being in Stolte.89
After this standard of review was created, the Georgia Supreme
Court refused to extend it further. In 2016, in Gates v. State,90 the
supreme court declined to extend the “reasonable probability” standard
to non-death penalty cases, stating that appellate review is not
accessible when the defense fails to make a contemporaneous objection

80. O.C.G.A. § 9-10-185 (2021).
81. Id.
82. Williams, 311 Ga. at 448, 858 S.E.2d at 488 (citing Wright v. Wright, 222 Ga. 777,
781, 152 S.E.2d 363, 367 (1966); Ehrlich v. Mills, 203 Ga. 600, 601, 48 S.E.2d 107, 108
(1948)).
83. 274 Ga. 366, 553 S.E.2d 154 (2001), overruled by Williams, 311 Ga. at 451, 858
S.E.2d at 490.
84. Mullins, 274 Ga. at 366–67, 553 S.E.2d 155–56.
85. Williams, 311 Ga. at 450, 858 S.E.2d at 489.
86. Id. at 448, 858 S.E.2d at 488.
87. Stolte, 291 Ga. at 483, 731 S.E.2d at 657 n.4.
88. 281 Ga. 326, 638 S.E.2d 284 (2006), overruled by Williams, 311 Ga. at 451, 858
S.E.2d at 489–90.
89. Williams, 311 Ga. at 450, 858 S.E.2d at 489.
90. 298 Ga. 324, 781 S.E.2d 772 (2016).
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to opposing counsel’s closing argument.91 Thus, the supreme court has
recently taken a stand against allowing appellate review when counsel
fails to raise a timely contemporaneous objection to alleged violations
during closing arguments, even when these arguments may have
changed the outcome of the trial.
IV. COURT’S RATIONALE
In Williams, the Georgia Supreme Court utilized the legal
background outlined above when faced with two related issues.92 The
first issue was whether a timely contemporaneous objection must be
raised for a violation of a ruled upon motion in limine, during the
opposing counsel’s closing, in order to preserve the issue for appeal.93
The second issue was whether appellate review in civil cases is an
available option when the party fails to raise a contemporaneous
objection to improper argument.94 All justices concurred, and the
opinion of the court authored by Justice McMillian analyzed the
precedent and legal background outlined above to examine each of these
issues one-at-a-time.95
A. Contemporaneous Objections Are Required
The supreme court first concluded that a contemporaneous objection
is required by counsel primarily for five reasons. First, the court
disagreed with the court of appeals’ extension of the rules in Harley
Davidson Motor Co. and Reno, to motions in limine related to
argument, because this extension was done without any explanation
and had never been made in any supreme court cases.96 Second, the
holdings in Reno and the near forty years of precedent following Reno,
which reasoned that a contemporaneous objection is not required for
preservation if a party violated a ruled upon motion in limine, were
abrogated by the new evidence code, which was codified in O.C.G.A.
§ 24-1-103(a)(2).97 In analyzing this section the court relied on federal
precedent to determine that the statute should extend equally to both

91. Id. at 328–29, 781 S.E.2d at 776–77.
92. Williams, 311 Ga. at 447, 449, 858 S.E.2d at 487, 488–89.
93. Id. at 447, 858 S.E.2d at 487.
94. Id. at 449, 858 S.E.2d at 488-89.
95. Id. at 439, 450–52, 858 S.E.2d at 479, 489–90.
96. Id. at 443–44, 858 S.E.2d at 485.
97. Id. at 445–46, 858 S.E.2d at 486; see id. at 447, 858 S.E.2d at 487 n. 5.; see also
O.C.G.A. § 24-1-103(a)(2) (2021).
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evidence and statements made by counsel during closing arguments.98
Third, in relying on the reasoning previously mentioned in Weldon, the
court believed requiring a contemporaneous objection to an alleged
violation of a motion in limine would further the purpose of the
contemporaneous objection rule as it would allow the trial court an
opportunity to remedy the error at the time the error is made.99 Fourth,
the court held that the contemporaneous objection rule would not
further highlight prejudicial evidence or arguments in front of the
jury.100 Relying on Lynn, the court reasoned that the contemporaneous
objection requirement would give the trial court an opportunity to
provide curative instructions and warn counsel of the violation,
resolving any prejudicial effects.101 Lastly, the court, echoing the
sentiments mentioned earlier in Wainright and King, preferred the
contemporaneous objection rule approach because it is more efficient;
incentivizes parties to challenge alleged violations at the time they
occur; and prevents parties from sitting back, doing nothing, and
appealing the case later.102
B. Unpreserved Claims of Error Should Not Be Reviewed, Thus Stolte Is
Overruled
In Williams, the defendants made two arguments asserting that
their unpreserved claims of error should be reviewed on appeal.103 First,
the defendants asserted that the ruled upon motion in limine should be
considered an “objection made” under O.C.G.A. § 9-10-15, thus making
a contemporaneous objection unnecessary.104 The supreme court
disagreed with this reasoning.105 The court determined that precedent
interpreting O.C.G.A. § 9-10-15 explicitly held the “objection made”
requirement to be considered a contemporaneous objection.106 Also, the
defendants failed to cite to any cases where a motion in limine acted as
an objection made under O.C.G.A. § 9-10-15, thus rendering their first
argument moot.107
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Williams, 311 Ga. at 446–47, 858 S.E.2d at 486–87.
Id. at 446, 858 S.E.2d at 486.
Id. at 447, 858 S.E.2d at 487.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 448, 858 S.E.2d at 488.
Id.
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Second, the defendants relied on Stolte, asserting that appellate
review was still available to consider whether the improper argument
in “reasonable probability” changed the trial’s result.108 The court
responded by referring to their previous lack of confidence in Stolte,
where the court questioned whether the reasonable probability
standard should even be applied in civil cases when it is normally only
applied in death penalty cases.109 Instead of following the reasonable
probability standard, the court utilized the reasoning previously
mentioned from Gates and determined that appellate review in civil
cases for failures to raise contemporary objections is unnecessary as the
matter should have initially been resolved by the trial court during
trial.110 Thus, the court determined the defendant’s arguments to be
unpersuasive and held that there is no reason in civil cases to review
unpreserved claims of error in closing statements.111 After making this
determination, the court went on to overrule Stolte and any other cases
following Stolte’s reasonable probability standard for appellate review
of failures to object to motion in limine violations.112
In conclusion, the Georgia Supreme Court determined that
contemporaneous objections to arguments violating motions in limine
were required per Georgia’s new evidence rules.113 The court also
established that the new evidence rules do not allow motions in limine
to preserve violations for appeal on their own, and thus, abrogated any
old state caselaw that provided otherwise.114 Finally the court held that
unpreserved claims of error should not be reviewed and overruled
Stolte, along with the reasonable probability standard for
contemporaneous objections in civil cases.115 The court held in favor of
Williams and reversed the court of appeals’ decision, thus granting the
jury’s award of $18,000,000.116
V. IMPLICATIONS
The Georgia Supreme Court’s decision in Williams will have a
significant effect on how trial and appellate lawyers approach cases.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id.
Id. at 448, 450–51, 858 S.E.2d at 488—89.
Id. at 448–51, 858 S.E.2d at 488-90.
Id. at 449, 451, 858 S.E.2d at 488–90.
Id. at 452, 858 S.E.2d at 491 n.12.
Id. at 445–447, 451–52, 858 S.E.2d at 485–87, 490.
Id. at 445–47, 858 S.E.2d at 486–87.
Id. at 449–51, 858 S.E.2d at 488–90.
Id. at 441, 453, 858 S.E.2d at 483, 491.
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What may seem like a small change in Georgia’s evidentiary law will
have a lasting impact on virtually every civil and criminal non-death
penalty case that goes to trial.
Requiring contemporaneous objections to motions in limine will force
trial lawyers to better plan their pretrial and trial strategy as they now
need to make sure their case has a chance to survive appeal.117 Trial
lawyers will now have to be on the edge of their seat during trial and
must consider working hand-in-hand with appellate experts to help
safeguard the record for appeal.118
This ruling will also incentivize trial attorneys to narrow the scope of
their pretrial motions in limine and thus, promote efficiency, fairness,
and predictability.119 Before Williams, cases could be overturned
because the losing parties were able to take advantage of using broad
motions in limine on appeal without actually objecting to any
unfavorable statements made at trial.120 This tactic allowed trial
attorneys to sit on their hands during trial and then hire an expensive
appellate lawyer to “comb the record” for any potential violation at
trial.121
Not only does this ruling help to promote efficiency, fairness, and
predictability by reducing the number of appeals, but it will also act as
a “course correction” for Georgia law as it will put Georgia in line with
most of the other states in the country.122 This change will also put
Georgia more in line with the FRE which was the original intent of the

117. Rosie Manins, Ga. Justices Tighten Net On Evidence Exclusions, Objections,
LAW360 (May 20, 2021, 3:59 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1386225/ga-justicestighten-net-on-evidence-exclusions-objections (describing the future impact the Williams
ruling will have on both trial and appellate lawyers in all fields).
118. Manins, supra note 117, at 2. Austin Bersinger, Partner at Barnes & Thornburg
LLP, stated that “it [is] more important now than ever for lawyers to be [alert] at trial”
and develop strategies to work with appellate lawyers so that they may preserve the
evidentiary record. Id.
119. Manins, supra note 117, at 2. Elissa Haynes, appellate attorney and Partner at
Drew Eckl & Farnham LLP, stated that the Williams ruling will “make all lawyers on
both sides of the ‘v’ think twice about drafting their motions in limine.” Id.
120. Manins, supra note 117, at 1. Prior to Williams, the caselaw created what Georgia
attorneys called the “motion in limine trap” which encouraged large numbers of
excessively broad and ambiguous limine motions that were difficult to understand but
could still overturn cases. Id.
121. Manins, supra note 117, at 1.
122. Manins, supra note 117, at 2. Mathew Stoddard of the Stoddard firm stated that
the Williams ruling is “an incredibly significant ruling for anyone involved in trials or
appeals . . . that puts Georgia law in line with most of the country on how trials should be
administered.” Id.
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Georgia General Assembly when it changed Georgia’s evidence code in
2011.123
A possible negative consequence of requiring contemporaneous
objections will be that more objections will occur at trial, thus
increasing the chance of highlighting damaging evidence in front of
juries.124 Also, requiring contemporaneous objections will no longer
allow parties another chance to re-litigate on appeal.125 However, the
benefits will likely outweigh the negatives. Requiring contemporaneous
objections will bring Georgia trial practice back to what it was prior to
1979126 and further the integrity of the judicial process by rewarding
attentive litigators and by cutting down on needless retrials.127 Through
this decision, the supreme court makes it clear that Georgia is now a
state where judicial integrity is paramount and where there are
possibly “no downsides . . . for honest litigants playing by the rules.”128

123. Manins, supra note 117, at 1.
124. Manins, supra note 117, at 2.
125. Manins, supra note 117, at 2.
126. Manins, supra note 117, at 2–3. Because Georgia’s contemporaneous objection
rule has been around for more than 150 years, the Williams ruling essentially brings
state trial practice back to what it was prior to 1979, when Georgia justices first held that
objections were not necessary to preserve violations of motions in limine on appeal. Id.
127. Manins, supra note 117, at 2–3.
128. Manins, supra note 117, at 3. Brandon L. Peak, partner at Butler Wooten & Peak
LLP, stated that there are “no downsides to this opinion for honest litigants playing by
the rules” as the old motion in limine trap was “fundamentally unfair to litigants, wasted
judicial resources, and caused needless retrials.” Id.

